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Why we need to care about it in security?
Digital Forensics -- Identify digital 
evidence for an investigation
Why we need to care about it in security?
=
Laika [OSDI‟08]: Using Data structure as a 
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 Randomizability of Data structure
 Network communication
41 struct udphdr {
42     u_int16_t   uh_sport;       /* source port */
43     u_int16_t   uh_dport;       /* destination port */
44     u_int16_t   uh_ulen;        /* udp length */
45     u_int16_t   uh_sum;         /* udp checksum */
46 };
Technical Challenges (I)
 Randomizability of Data structure
 Network communication




58   {
59     char *fs_spec;                /* block special device name */
60     char *fs_file;                  /* file system path prefix */
61     char *fs_vfstype;            /* File system type, ufs, nfs */
62     char *fs_mntops;            /* Mount options ala -o */
63     const char *fs_type;        /* FSTAB_* from fs_mntops */
64     int fs_freq;                     /* dump frequency, in days */
65     int fs_passno;                 /* pass number on parallel dump */
66   };
67
Technical Challenges (I)
 Randomizability of Data structure
 Network communication
 Standard definition (e.g., stdio.h)
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 Randomizability of Data structure
 Network communication
 Standard definition (e.g., stdio.h)
 Zero length array
 Directly using data offset to access some fields
 Initialized data structure
struct role = { "Hamlet", 7, FALSE, "Prince of Denmark", "Kenneth Branagh"};
Technical Challenges (I)
 Randomizability of Data structure
 Network communication
 Standard definition (e.g., stdio.h)
 Zero length array
 Directly using data offset to access some fields
 Initialized data structure
 …
 How to spot the randomizable data structures
Programmer has the confidence
Technical Challenges (II)
 How to randomize a data structure
















#n data structures, #m fields each variance (m!)n
Technical Challenges (II)
 How to randomize a data structure
 (1) Reorder the Field













 How to randomize a data structure
 (1) Reorder the Field
 (2) Insert Garbage fields




















Tree optimizationsree opti izationsTree optimizationsree opti izations
Expansion into RTL



















Front end Middle end Back end
RTL passes passesRTL passesSSA passes 
Four Intermediate Representations: AST, GIMPLE, SSA, RTL
Instrument at AST because of
 (1) Much more original information 
 The type and scope information for data structures 
 (2) Easier to understand and modify
















How to use our compiler
<obfuscate-specifier>          ::= __obfuscate__(( <obfuscate-list> )) 
<obfuscate-list>                   ::= <obfuscate-property>
| <obfuscate-list>, <obfuscate-property> 
<obfuscate-property>          ::= ε | __reorder__ | __garbage__ 
Evaluation on Estimation of Randomizability
Program LOC Struct class w
42-Virus 0.88 1/1 - 4E5
Slapper 2.44 26/30 - 5E47
pingrootkit 4.81 26/27 - 5E15
Mood-nt 5.31 36/37 - 8E119
tnet-1.55 11.56 14/17 - 7E82
Suckit 24.71 110/111 - 9E159
agobot3 245.44 23/31 50/50 2E1106
patch2.5.4 11.53 5/7 - 4E3
bc-1.06 14.29 20/21 - 6E56
tidy4 15.95 9/18 - 2E52
ctags-5.7 27.22 51/79 - 3E668
openssh4.3 76.05 63/80 - 4E1271
Most of the programmer defined data structure is randomizable
Evaluations against rootkit attacks
Rootkit Attack Vector Prevented?
adore-ng 0.56 LKM √
enyelkm 1.2 LKM √
override LKM √
fuuld DKOM-/dev/kmem √
intoxnia ng2 LKM X
Mood nt /dev/kmem X
No data structure involved in these attacks
Randomized “task_struct”
Evaluation on Signature Evasion




7zip-4.6.4 (A) 502K 4.26% 0.50942826
7zip-4.6.4 (B) 504K 5.88% 0.51487480
agobot3-0.2.1 (A) 1.18M 6.18% 0.70016150
agobot3-0.2.1 (B) 1.19M 6.34% 0.60932887
Limitation & Future work
 AST vs. GIMPLE, SSA, RTL
 Automatic Identification of the Randomizability
 Struct/Class split
 Variant Instance is generated by compiling
Related work
 Security through Diversity [Forrest et al. 1997]
 Address Space Randomization (ASR) (e.g., Kernel Patch 
[PAX], Loader [SRDS‟03], Source code [Sec‟05], binary code 
[Sec‟03])
 Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) [CCS‟03]
 Data Randomization (e.g., PointGuard [Sec‟03])
 Operating System Interfaces Randomization (e.g., 
RandSys[SRDS‟07])
 Multi-variant System (e.g, N-variant[Sec‟05], Die-
hard[PLDI‟06])
 Layout Manipulations and Obfuscations in 
Compilers
 Propolice
 Cache aware layout reorganization optimization [GCC 
Developers' Summit „05, ‟07, PLDI‟04]
Conclusion
 DSLR -- A new software randomization 
technique
 Thwart data structure need-to-know attack
 Rootkit
 Increase the bar for software defense
 Forensics analysis
 Data structure based signature (false negatives)
Source code (GPL)
http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/zlin/dimva09.html
zlin@cs.purdue.edu
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